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Synthetic Hype: A Skeptical View of the Promise of Synthetic Biology
Abstract

This article urges a cautious approach to assessing the promises of synthetic biology based on broad political
and economic concerns rather than technical ones. Specifically, I mark three related dynamics which place the
current buzz around synthetic biology in a broader context. These dynamics are not necessarily distinctive to
synthetic biology, but perhaps for that very reason, they may carry added weight. First, is the place of synthetic
biology as the latest entry in the procession of what I call the “receding horizons of biotechnological promise.”
Second, is the excitement generated by the related promise of finding seemingly direct technological fixes for
otherwise complex and messy social and political problems. Third, the resulting tendency to locate such
technological fixes in the marketplace which then leads to a (re)allocation of scarce public goods toward
market-oriented solutions to common problems that might be more appropriately and equitably addressed
through public initiatives.
This article, then, is less an examination of the promise and perils of synthetic biology per se and more of a
cautionary examination of the challenges presented by the claims made on behalf of synthetic biology. It does
not critique the technology as such, nor is it meant to be understood as science-bashing in any way. Rather, I
aim to locate claims made on behalf of an emerging technology in their social and political context. Science is
more than just theories and applications developed in the lab. It is also a social enterprise that makes demands
on people and institutions outside the lab. In the regard, my basic concern here is to re-frame or move beyond
existing debates over the ethical implication of synthetic biology for society in general, and consider more
specifically, the ethical implications of the impact pursuing synthetic biology might have upon other
technologies and policies meant to address similar problems.
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SYNTHETIC HYPE: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF
THE PROMISE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Jonathan Kahn, J.D., Ph.D*
I. INTRODUCTION
There are diverse definitions of "synthetic biology."
For the
purposes of this article, a relatively early article in the journal Nature
Reviews Genetics provides a reasonably useful definition: "A discipline
that embraces the emerging ability to design, synthesize and evolve new
genomes or biomimetic systems."' The basic idea of synthetic biology is
to make biology more like engineering, creating standardized biological
"parts" that can be combined to redesign existing biological systems and
create entirely new ones that do not already exist in the natural world. It
is aptly represented by the concept of "BioBricks," a trademarked term
describing "standard biological parts [that] a synthetic biologist or
biological engineer can [use to] program living organisms in the same
way a computer scientist can program a computer." 2
Synthetic biology has been around in some form or another for
several years (or even decades, if one considers recombinant DNA to be
a technology of synthetic biology), but it came to national proninence in
May 2010, when the J. Craig Venter Institute announced it had created
the world's first self-replicating synthetic genome in a bacterial cell of a
different species.
Soon thereafter, President Obama asked his
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues ("PCSBI") to
explore and advise him of the major issues presented by current and
promised developments in the field of synthetic biology.3
On December 16, 2010, the PCSBI issued its report, which
Commission Chair Amy Gutmann (also President of the University of
Pennsylvania) characterized as a comprehensive review of "'the
developing field of synthetic biology to understand both its potential

I

Professor, Hamline University School of Law.
Jay Shendure, Robi D. Mitra, Chris Varma & George M. Church, Advanced Sequencing

Technologies: Methods and Goals, 5 NATURE REVIEws GENETIcs, 335, 336 (2004), available at

http://arep.med.harvard.edu/PGP/Shendure04.pdf; Glossary, NATURE.COM, http://www.
nature.com/nrg/journal/v5/n5/glossary/nrgl325glossary.html (last visited Apr. 27,
2011).
2

BioBricks Foundation -Info, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/BioBricks-

Foundation/171198089577371?v=info (click "See All" link) (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
3 Transcript of Synthetic Biology Meeting, Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues (July 9, 2010), available at http://bioethics.gov/cms/node/163 (last visited
June 22,2011).
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rewards and risks.'" 4 The Commission considered such potential
benefits as "the development of vaccines and new drugs and the
production of biofuels that could someday reduce the need for fossil
fuels."5 It also explored "the risks posed by the technology, including
the inadvertent release of a laboratory-created organism into nature and
the potential adverse effects of such a release on ecosystems." 6 To
reduce any possible threat, some scientists and ethicists advised careful
monitoring and review of the research. Gutmann noted that the PCSBI
"'considered an array of approaches to regulation-from allowing
unfettered freedom with minimal oversight .. . to prohibiting
experiments until they can be ruled completely safe beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" 7 The Commission ended up choosing what Gutmann called a
"'middle course'," advocating that the government exercise "'[p]rudent
vigilance"' so that when "'federal oversight is needed[, it] can be
exercised in a way that is consistent with scientific progress.'" 8 The
Commission also recommended several "steps in order to minimize risks
and to foster innovation."9 It stated that "[rjisk assessment activities
across the government need to be coordinated and field release
permitted only after reasonable risk assessment," and further
recommended that:
Recognizing that international coordination is essential
for safety and security, the Department of State, in
concert with the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Homeland Security,
should collaborate with governments around the world,
as well as leading international organizations, such as
the World Health Organization to promote ongoing
dialogue about emerging technologies like synthetic
biology.10
That same day, a coalition of more than thirty environmental groups
sent a joint letter to the PCSBI criticizing the failure to call for tougher
4
Press Release, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Presidential
Commission on Bioethics Calls for Enhanced Federal Oversight in Emerging Field of
Synthetic Biology 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/documents/
synthetic-biology/PCSBI-Synthetic-Biology-Report-Press-Release-12.16.10.pdf (last visited
Mar. 3,2011).
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1.
8

Id.

9

Id. at 2.

1o

Id.
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precautions, including a moratorium, until scientists prove such
organisms are safe. 1 The letter argued that the Commission's tentative
approach amounted to an abdication of the government's role to provide
effective oversight of emerging technologies, and urged the PSCBI to
adopt the "precautionary principle" as a guide to regulatory oversight,
in place of "'prudent vigilance.'"1 2 As stated in the letter, the
precautionary principle requires: "'When an activity raises threats of
harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures
should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully
established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity,
rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.'" 3 The coalition
was concerned with many of the same questions of biosecurity and
environmental impact that occupied the PCSBI, but reached very
different conclusions about how to address them. 4
In this Article, I too would like to urge precaution, but a different
sort of precaution based on broader political and economic concerns
rather than technical ones. Specifically, I would like to mark three
related dynamics, which place the current buzz around synthetic biology
in a broader context. These dynamics are not necessarily distinctive to
synthetic biology, but perhaps for that very reason they may carry added
weight. First is the place of synthetic biology as the latest entry in the
procession of what I call the "receding horizons of biotechnological
promise." Second is the excitement generated by the related promise of
finding seemingly direct technological fixes for otherwise complex and
messy social and political problems. The third dynamic is the resulting
tendency to locate such technological fixes in the marketplace, which
leads to a (re)allocation of scarce public goods toward market-oriented
solutions to common problems that might be more appropriately and
equitably addressed through public initiatives.
This Article, then, is less an examination of the promise and perils of
synthetic biology per se and more of a cautionary examination of the
challenges presented by the claims made on behalf of synthetic biology.
It does not critique the technology as such, nor is it meant to be
understood as science-bashing in any way. Rather, I aim to locate claims
made on behalf of an emerging technology in their social and political
context. Science is more than just theories and applications developed in

Letter from Civil Society to President's Commission on Synthetic Biology (Dec. 16,
2010), available at http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=5517 (last visited
Mar. 3, 2011).
11

12
13
14

Id.
Id. (italics omitted).
See id.
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the lab. It is also a social enterprise that makes demands on people and
institutions outside the lab. In that regard, my basic concern here is to
re-frame or move beyond existing debates over the ethical implication of
synthetic biology for society in general, and consider more specifically
the possible ethical implications of pursuing synthetic biology for other
technologies and policies meant to address similar problems.
II. RECEDING HORIZONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PROMISE

Synthetic biology appears to be the latest in a long line of claims of
grand promise that have accompanied demands for both monetary and
intellectual resources associated with successive major biotechnological
undertakings over the past twenty years. These undertakings have been
worthy in their own right but have not, as yet, come anywhere near
realizing the extravagant claims made by their initial promoters.
Modern developments in biotechnology have been driven, in part, by an
ever receding horizon of promise. Many scholars have commented on
the politics of promise and potential in biotechnology. 5 With each new
advance, claims are staked out for future benefits, which remain
unfulfilled until the next new advance re-stakes the claim and re-sets the
horizon for realizing its promise further into the future.
The dynamic really began with the Human Genome Project ("HGP")
in the 1990s. With its call for massive federal and private investments,
the initial promoters of the HGP promised everything from a cure to
cancer to unlocking the key to extending the life span. Great fanfare
attended the completion of the first draft of the human genome in 2000.
President Clinton declared that "[in coming years, doctors increasingly
will be able to cure diseases like Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, diabetes and
cancer by attacking their genetic roots," 16 and Prime Minister Blair
characterized the first draft as "a breakthrough that opens the way for
massive advances in the treatment of cancer and hereditary diseases, and

See generally, e.g., ADAM HEDGECOE, THE POLMCS OF PERSONALISED MEDICINE:
PHARMACOGENEnCS IN THE CUNIC 9-28 (2004) (discussing the role of the sociology of
expectation in promoting the promise of pharmacogenomics); MICHAEL FORTUN,
PROMISING GENOMICS: ICELAND AND DECODE GENETICS IN A WORLD OF SPECULATION
(2008) (providing an ethnographic analysis of the power of promissory science in
promoting the rise and fall of DeCode genetics in Iceland).
16
Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President, Prime Minister Tony Blair of
England (Via Satellite), Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the National Human Genome
Research Institute, and Dr. Craig Venter, President and Chief Scientific Officer, Celera
Genomics Corporation, on the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human
Genome Project (June 26, 2000), available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
HumanGenome/project/clinton2.shtml.
'5
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that is only the beginning."' 7 Also in attendance was Craig Venter, then
of Celera Genomics, who similarly enthused that with knowledge from
the genome, we now had "the potential to reduce the number of cancer
deaths to zero during our lifetimes."' 8
Ten years and many billions of dollars later, we are still waiting for
these miracles. For example, while biotechnology has contributed some
notable advances to fighting some particular cancers (such as Herceptin
for HER2+ breast cancer and Rituxan for non-Hodgkin's lymphoma), the
overall death rate in the U.S. from all cancers went from 198 per 100,000
in 2000, the year President Clinton announced the completion of the first
draft of the human genome, to 178 per 100,000 in 2007. 19 A positive
advance to be sure, but hardly miraculous, and possibly more
attributable to social factors such as declining rates of smoking than to
advances in biotechnology.
As the initial promises from the HGP failed to materialize, successive
new rounds of hype followed: stem cell therapies would make the blind
see and the lame walk; pharmacogenomics would provide
individualized therapies to tailor medicines directly to your personal
genetic profile; Genome Wide Association Studies ("GWAS") would
unravel the mysteries of common complex diseases such as diabetes;
new initiatives, such as the Personal Genome Project would provide the
sort of information we originally thought to glean from the HGP; the
epigenome would provide the answers to how the genome really
worked; and so on, and so on.
Let us begin with stem cells. The National Institutes of Health
("NIH") declares that pluripotent stem cells "offer the possibility of a
renewable source of replacement cells and tissues to treat a myriad of
diseases, conditions, and disabilities including Parkinson's disease,
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, spinal cord injury, burns, heart disease,
diabetes, and arthritis."20

Pluripotent cells have the potential to

differentiate into almost any cell in the body and are hence deemed to
have the greatest potential for developing stem cell-based therapies. 21
17

Id.
Id.
19
SEER Cancer Statistics Review 1975-2007, NATL CANCER INST., available at
http://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975-2007/browse-csr.php?section=2&page=sect 02_table.06.
html (last visited May 9, 2011).
2
Stem
Cell
Infonnation, NAYL
INSITUTES
OF HEALTH,
available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/health.asp (last modified Jan. 7, 2011).
21
See What are Stem Cells?, U. MINN. CENTER FOR BIOETHICs, available at
http://www.ahc.umn.edu/bioethics/prod/groups/ahc/@pub/@ahc/documents/asset/a
Basics, NAVL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, available at
hc_75703.pdf;
Stem Cell
http://stemcells.nih.gov/statieresources/info/basics/SCprimer2009.pdf (last visited Mar.
3, 2011).
18
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Pluripotent stem cells, however, have been obtainable most readily from
research on cells from blastocysts or early stage human embryos. This
embroiled such research in the messy world of abortion politics, and on
August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that federal funds
could not be used for research using human embryonic stem cells unless
the stem cell lines had been derived prior to 9:00 p.m. EDT on August 9,

2001.22
Scientists sought a technical fix for the fundamental political
problem by developing technologies that would create pluripotent stem
cells without using embryonic material. In 2006, researchers identified
conditions that would allow some specialized adult cells to be
"'reprogrammed'" genetically to assume a stem cell-like state.23 These
new stem cells were called induced pluripotent stem cells ("iPSCs"). 24
Independent of the fact that no new widely applicable stem cell therapies
had yet been developed, researchers hoped that this technological fix
would side-step the political problems presented by research involving
material derived from human embryos.25 This avenue of research may
indeed be very promising, but it remains largely a promise.
To complicate matters, the limits of technology may be forcing
politics back into the picture. In 2010, "researchers found that iPSCs
'carry a memory of their past identities,'" 26 and in early 2011, they found
that no matter what method is used to reprogram the cell "'all of these
methods still mutate the genes of the resulting cells.'" 27 This does not
necessarily mean that iPSCs cannot be used for developing stem cell
therapies, but it does mean that they might not be readily substitutable
for the pluripotent stem cells derived from embryos. In any event, with
the exception of a few experimental treatments for certain extremely rare
genetic disorders and a recent treatment for macular degeneration, there
have been no significant clinically applicable stem cell therapies yet
developed.2 8
2
Stem Cell Information, NIH's
Role in Federal
Policy, available
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/NIHFedPolicy.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
2
NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 21, at 2.
24
25

Id.

27
28

Id.

at

See id. at 9-12 (describing the potential application of adult stem cells).
2
Not All
They're Cracked Up To Be?, GENOMEWEB (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.genomeweb.com/blog/not-all-theyre-cracked-be;
Ed Young, Worrying
Genetic Changes In Reprogrammed Stem Cells, DIscoVER, http://blogs.discovermagazine.
com/notrocketscience/2011/03/02/worrying-genetic-hanges-in-reprogrammed-stemcells/ (last visited June 21, 2011).
Bone marrow transplants may be considered an even larger and more significant
exception, but this is a technology first developed in the 1960s and not dependent on the
new biotechnologies that manipulate cells at the molecular level. See Stem Cells in Use, U.
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Soon after stem cell therapy hit the headlines, researchers were
calling GWAS the next great frontier of promise for realizing the benefits
of genomic medicine. In GWAS, the genomes from many different
people are scanned for genetic markers that can serve to predict the
presence of a disease. 29 The idea is that such genetic markers can be used
to understand how genes contribute to the disease and aid in the
development of better prevention and treatment strategies.3 GWAS
held out particular hopes for understanding the genetics of common
complex diseases. For example, in 2006, the NIH Director Elias
Zerhouni declared that, "this research approach holds great promise for
providing an understanding of the genomic contributions to cancer."31
Once again, the language of promise was utilized, and once again, five
years later, we are still waiting for that promise to materialize. As one
article recently noted, GWAS had so far proven unable
to find important genes for disease in human
populations. In study after study, applying GWAs [sic]
to every common (non-infectious) physical disease and
mental disorder, the results have been remarkably
consistent: only genes with very minor effects have been
uncovered.
In other words, the genetic variation
confidently expected by medical geneticists to explain
common diseases, cannot be found.32
Following GWAS, the next entry into the genonuc promise
sweepstakes was epigenetics. Epigenetics is the study of "heritable
changes caused by the activation and deactivation of genes without any
change in the underlying DNA sequence of the organism."33 Such
changes may involve the environment immediately surrounding the
DNA, where methyl groups bind to DNA in a manner that affects their
UTAH, http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/tech/stemcells/sctoday/
5, 2011).
9
Genome-Wide

Association

Studies,

NATL

HUMAN

(last visited Mar.

GENOME

RES.

INST.,

http://www.genome.gov/Glossary/index.cfm?id=91
(last visited June 21, 2011)
[hereinafter NHGRI, GWAS].
3
Id.
31 Press Release, National Institutes of Health, Statement From the NIH on Cancer
Genetics Findings at Johns Hopkins University (Sept. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub-releases/2006-09/nhgr-st090606.php.
32 Jonathan Latham and Allison Wilson, The Great DNA Data Deficit: Are Genes for
Disease a Mirage?, BIOSCIENCE RESOURCE PROJEcr (Dec. 8, 2010) (citation and second
parenthetical omitted), available at www.bioscienceresource.org/commentaries/article.php
?id=46.
3
Epigenetics, NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RES. INsr., http://www.genome.gov/glossary/
index.cfm?id=528 (last visited June 21, 2011) [hereinafter NHGRI, Epigenetics].
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expression. But broader impacts also affect epigenomic changes,
including the environment external to an organism, drugs, diet and the
aging process. In 2010, Time magazine declared:
The great hope for ongoing epigenetic research is that
with the flick of a biochemical switch, we could tell
genes that play a role in many diseases - including
cancer, schizophrenia, autism, Alzheimer's, diabetes and
many others-to lie dormant. We could, at long last,
have a trump card to play against Darwin.3
Ironically, discoveries in epigenetics have, in part, led to recent
concerns over the limitations of induced pluripotent stem cells as its
researchers found more epigenetic changes in the iPSCs than anyone
previously thought.35 Other than discovering how new discoveries may
problemize earlier technological advances, it is still too early to tell
whether epigenetics will lead to clinically useful applications any time
soon.
Where then do we stand with these existing technologies and some
of their promises? Beginning with the promises of gene therapy, it
deserves noting that when the genetic basis for sickle cell anemia was
characterized in 1949, it quickly became known as the first "molecular
disease."3 6 Sixty years later, there is still no genetic therapy for sickle cell
anemia, let alone a cure. In 1989 the CFTR gene, which is associated with
Cystic Fibrosis, was first isolated just as the HGP was getting off the
ground.37 Yet, as with sickle cell anemia, there is still no viable gene
therapy available." The list could go on and on. The bottom line is that
the promises of revolutionary gene therapies made in the development
and promotion of the multi-billion dollar HGP have yet to be realized.
Similarly, the great hopes that stem cell therapy would cure spinal cord
injuries and Parkinson's disease or allow for the creation of subjectcompatible organs remain largely unfilled. As for the GWAS, after years
and untold billions of dollars devoted to the search for the genetic basis
of such common complex disease as diabetes and hypertension, perhaps
the best way to manage these diseases remains the relatively low tech
John Cloud, Why Your DNA Isn't Your Destiny, TIME (Jan. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1951968-2,00.html.
35 GENOMEWEB, supra note 26.
36
See KEITH WAILOO & STEPHEN PEMBERTON, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF GENETIC
3

MEDICINE 122-25 (2006).

John. R. Riordan et al., Identification of the Cystic Fibrosis Gene:
Characterizationof Complementary DNA, 245 SCI. 1066, 1066-73 (1989).
3
See generally WAILOO & PEMBERTON, supra note 36, at 61-115.
37

Cloning and
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and common sense advice given for decades: eat better and exercise
more. But this therapy does not make much money for anyone.
One area where genetic technology has led to direct applications is in
the field of diagnostic testing. There has been much success in this area,
but less in terms of therapy or cures and more in terms of helping people
make informed choices -especially reproductive choices.
Genetic
screening for Tay-Sachs was among the early success stories. Like sickle
cell anemia, Tay-Sachs is a recessive genetic disorder. This means that a
person may carry one copy of the gene but manifest no symptoms. If
two carriers have a child, the child will have a one in four chance of
getting two copies of the gene, and hence the disease. Tay-Sachs is a
severe, debilitating and ultimately fatal disease that usually kills children
within a few years of birth. 39 The trait has a particularly high frequency
among Ashkenazi Jews and French Canadians. 4 Beginning in the 1970s,
American Jews began a concerted effort to educate their community to
undergo preconception or prenatal screening for Tay-Sachs, leading to a
steady decline of babies born with Tay-Sachs in the U.S. 41 This
preconception and prenatal screening for a variety of conditions has
since expanded dramatically and become a routine part of many
people's reproductive experience.42 Yet these advances remain very
limited and non-therapeutic. Indeed, with current advances in forensic
uses of DNA technology, it may reasonably be said that you are more
likely to have your DNA used to convict you of a crime today than you
are to have it used to cure you of a disease.43
Time and time again over the past two decades, new advances in
biotechnology have rolled out to great fanfare and great promises. As
time horizons are met and promised results repeatedly fail to
materialize, new promises are made for new technologies, each time
pushing back the ever receding time horizon for concrete results. To be
clear, these advances are not failures. Each and every one has made
significant contributions to scientific knowledge and produced some
limited concrete results. But they have uniformly failed to live up to the
hype initially put forward to promote them.

39
4

See id. at 15-18.
See id. at 27.

41

Id. at 16.

42

See id. at 15-18.
See, e.g., Troy Duster, The Molecular Reinscription of Race: Unanticipated Issues in
Biotechnology and Forensic Science, 40 PATTERNS PREJUDICE 427, 427-29 (2006).

43
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III. THE PROMISES OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
The recent excitement over synthetic biology must be understood in
the context of these earlier promises and their track record. So, what are
some of the promises made on behalf of synthetic biology? The chair of
the President's Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues listed the
following potential benefits: "the expeditious synthesis of vaccines in
response to pandemics, and the ability to engineer algae and other
microbes to spur advances in agriculture, aquaculture, biofuels,
pharmaceutical
and
medicine,
regenerative
bioremediation,
development and production."44 All are worthy goals, but they are
claims that have been made repeatedly on behalf of diverse
biotechnological endeavors over the past twenty years. Does this mean
they should not be pursued? Of course not. But we must keep such
claims in perspective and consider the costs of the pursuit.
Science writer Roberta Kwok recently cautioned in the journal Nature
that there are already some problems with synthetic biology and the
Kwok identified particular characterizations of
hype around it."
synthetic biology, which she found over-hyped and in need of some
cautious correction. First is the claim that synthetic "BioBricks" would
work like Legos, easily snapped together like so many parts in a
mechanical engineering project.46 Kwok noted the "[hard] truth ... that
many of the parts are not well characterized, or work unpredictably in
different configurations and conditions." 47 Second is the notion that
synthetic biology will lead directly to the ability in effect to "rewire" cells
to serve new purposes. In fact, "[a]lthough computational modeling
may help scientists to predict cell behaviour, the cell is a complex,
variable, evolving operating system, very different from electronics.""
Kwok additionally argued that many biologically deconstructed and
reassembled parts may be incompatible and noted that "[o]nce
constructed and placed into cells, synthetic genetic circuits can have
unintended effects on their host."49 She noted the additional problem
that "[s]ynthetic biologists must also ensure that circuits function
Molecular activities inside cells are prone to random
reliably.
44 Amy Gutmann, Chair of the U.S. Presidential Comm'n for the Study of Bioethical
Issues, Plenary Address at the 8th Global Summit of Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Bodies (July
27, 2010), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/documents/synthetic-biology/PlenaryAddress-by-Amy-Gutmann-at-Singapore-Summit-07.27.10.pdf.
45
Roberta Kwok, Five Hard Truthsfor Synthetic Biology, 463 NATURE 288, 288 (2010).
46 Id.
47
4s

Id.

Id. at 289.

49 Id.
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fluctuations, or noise. Variation in growth conditions can also affect
behaviour. And over the long term, randomly arising genetic mutations
can kill a circuit's function altogether."50 She concluded with a quote
from Martin Fussenegger, a synthetic biologist at the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology ("ETH") Zurich: "The field has had its hype
phase, . . . . Now it needs to deliver."5'
While these are largely technical problems worthy of consideration,
they are not my primary concern in and of themselves; rather, it is the
relation of such challenges to the broader role synthetic biology may be
playing in framing our approaches to the very problems it aims to
address. To be clear, each of the initiatives and technologies discussed
above have much merit in their own right. The problem is not with the
technologies but with the hype. Hype has consequences. It does not
simply generate support for science; it profoundly affects major
decisions regarding the allocation of scarce biomedical resources and
promotes the increasing commercialization of academia. As Evans and
others recently noted in a special tenth anniversary review of the HGP in
the journal Science, "[flueling unrealistic expectations for predictive
genetic testing and uncritical translation of discoveries may also distract
our gaze from other promising approaches to preventing disease and
improving health." 52
IV. THE EASY APPEAL OF TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES FOR COMPLEX SOCIAL
PROBLEMS

In particular, we must be wary of the appeal of a neat technological
fix for problems that are inextricably bound up in social and political
dynamics. Take the promise of synthetically engineered biofuels for
example. In 2009, Craig Venter, now head of the new commercial
venture Synthetic Genomics, announced that he formed a $600 million
partnership with Exxon/Mobile to develop biofuels from algae.53 The
promises are many: reduced dependence on foreign oil, reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions, and extending fuel supplies. But these are not
merely technical issues.
Jim Thomas of the environmental watchdog ETC Group notes that
such promises are based on engineering yeast and bacteria that must
feed on biomass -organic material that is meant to replace fossil fuels.
He raises concerns that the new political economy of synthetic biology
5

Id. at 290.

51

Id.

52

James P. Evans et al., Deflating the Genomic Bubble, 331 Sa. 861, 861 (2011).
Alok Jha, Gene Scientist to Create Algae Biofuel with Exxon Mobil, GUARDIAN (July 14,
2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/14/green-algae-exxon-mobil.
53
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may lead to a shift in the sourcing of relevant strategic raw materials
from farmers in the global South to fermentation vats controlled by
agribusiness and petroleum behemoths in the North.54 Thomas goes on
to discuss one of the early, highly-touted breakthroughs of synthetic
biology, Amyris Biotechnologies' development of a synthetically
engineered version of the anti-malarial compound artemisinin. On the
one hand, it is a great breakthrough for providing supplies of a much
needed drug to fight the scourge of malaria, which itself
disproportionately affects poor countries in the global South. On the
other hand, Thomas argues that such advances do not come without
costs, noting that:
When that synthetic artemisinin goes on sale next year,
thousands of small-scale artemesia farmers could find
their incomes pulled from under them. In time they
may be joined in joblessness by rubber tappers as
Goodyear scales up tire-rubber production from
synthetic E. coli. Madagascar's vanilla farmers may be
close behind when Evolva's vanillin-in-a-vat goes
commercial.55
If not done thoughtfully, the drive for biomass to feed synthetic
biology applications could also lead to clear-cutting forests or heightened
demand for crops such as corn, leading to significant increases in global
food prices (a phenomenon already witnessed to some degree as a
consequence of the United States' drive to support the expanded
production of ethanol for fuel).56 In the end, we may decide that such
costs are worth the price, but it is imperative that we explicitly recognize
the implications of such developments and consider measures for
mitigating their unintended consequences.
With specific regard to biofuels, we should be mindful of the fact
that even if the technological problems of creating synthetic fuels are
solved, the political and social problems involving the global allocation
of resources, the economic structure of fuel markets, transportation
infrastructure, and myriad other issues contributing to energy needs and
global climate change would persist.
The promise of an easy
technological fix also promises to distract us from devoting the time and
5
Jim Thomas, The Sins of Syn Bio, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.slate.com/id/
2283299.
5
Id.
5
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BIoDIvERsITY AND LIVELIHOODs, 3-5 (2010), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/en/
node/5232.
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attention necessary to address difficult on-going political and social
issues that are never neatly resolved but need constant consideration.
V. MODELS OF REGULATION AND ALLOCATIONS OF AUTHORITY
The question then becomes, how are we to be mindful? Or more
specifically, what are the relative roles of public oversight/regulation
and private action in governing this emerging technology? Prominent
among the historical models for regulating newly emerging technologies
discussed by the PCSBI was the "Asilomar" conference, called by
scientists in 1975 to discuss the implications of recently discovered
techniques for recombinant DNA research.57 The conference was called
in the context of a voluntary moratorium on recombinant DNA research
that the scientific community imposed upon itself in light of concerns
about the safety of the new technology. The meetings at Asilomar led to
the formation of guidelines to ensure safety and a scientific peer review
group, today known as the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee of
the NIH.58 The Asilomar model, however, was most noted by the PCSBI
as an example of self-regulation within the scientific community. 59
Analogizing synthetic biology to the state of recombinant DNA
technology at the time of the 1975 Asilomar conference, the PCSBI
argued that "the scientific community-in academia, government and
the private sector-should continue to work together to evaluate and
respond to known and potential risks of synthetic biology as this science
evolves."60 It went on to recommend that "[t]he government should
support a continued culture of individual and corporate responsibility
and self-regulation by the research community." 61
Self regulation worked reasonably, even remarkably, well in the
mid-1970's, but there are several significant flaws with the PCSBI's
analogy to that era-not necessarily in terms of the character of the
scientific breakthrough, but rather in terms of the context within which
the breakthroughs occurred. In the early 1970's, genetic research was
largely conducted in the confines of universities, and there was no
biotechnology industry of which to speak. Professors of molecular

5

Presidential Comm'n for the Study of Bioethical Issues, New Directions: The Ethics of
Synthetic Biology and Emerging Technologies, 38 (2010) [hereinafter New Directions].
5
Id.; see also SHELDON KRIMsKY, GENETIC ALCHEMY: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROvERsY, 58-96, 126-64 (1982); Charles Weiner, Drawing the Line
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(2001).
9

60
61

New Directions,supra note 57, at 143.
Id. at 145.
Id.

1356 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.45

biology were primarily researchers, not patent holders or CEOs.
Historian Sheldon Krimsky notes that at the 1973 Gordon Conference,
which paved the way to Asilomar, only eight of the one hundred and
thirty scientists in attendance were from private industry. 62 In this
context, the practice of self-regulation involved calling on like-minded
and similarly situated academic scientists to bear the major responsibility
for safe and intelligent development. Krimsky notes that Asilomar thus
represented "an important shift from individual to collective
responsibility in this area of biological research."63
Yet even at Asilomar, we find the attraction of focusing on neat
technological fixes for complex problems that implicate both scientific
and social issues. As Sheila Jasanoff noted, the scientists at Asilomar
recognized that the new projects of emerging biotechnology were not
to be lightly undertaken, but they also presumed that the
route to greater understanding lay at the [molecular]
level at which they were conducting their ingenious
experiments, that is, at the level of molecular
manipulation and control. Molecules were small and
relatively easy to understand, as well as inanimate, and
thus safely removed from questions of politics or values.
That biotechnology might one day destabilize basic
elements of social order - kinship, for example, or
farmers' rights to own and sow seeds-was very far
from the thoughts of the field's founding fathers.6 4
Soon after Asilomar, the relationship between academic research and
industrial development of biotechnology began to transform rapidly.
The year before the 1975 conference, Stanley Cohen, then an associate
professor of medicine at Stanford University, and Herbert Boyer, a
biochemist and genetic engineer at the University of California at San
Francisco, filed a patent application for a "[p]rocess for [p]roducing
[b]iologically [flunctional [m]olecular [c]himeras."
The patent,
ultimately issued in 1980, together with two related patents formed the
basis for modem gene-splicing recombinant DNA technology by using
plasmids to transport foreign genes into bacteria.6 5 The patent provided
the foundation for the first great biotechnology company, Genentech,
62
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which Boyer co-founded in 1976 with venture capitalist Robert A.
Swanson. The patent not only helped launch the modem biotechnology
industry, but also "heralded a new era of university-industry
relationships and set a standard for subsequent efforts to commercialize
academic discoveries."6 Stanford University (a co-holder to the patent
rights) would go on to reap hundreds of millions of dollars from
licensing the technology over the course of the patent's life. 67 Cohen and
Boyer also came to symbolize a new model of academic-entrepreneur
who could become a millionaire through commercializing (usually via
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) his or her intellectual expertise.
The same year Cohen and Boyer received their first patent, President
Jimmy Carter signed into law two pieces of legislation that would come
to transform relations between industry and academic researchers. The
first, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980,6
encouraged interaction and cooperation among government laboratories,
universities, big industries, and small businesses. 69 The second, the
Patent and Trademark Laws Amendment Act of 1980,70 commonly
known as the Bayh-Dole Act, allowed institutions conducting research
with federal funds, such as universities, to retain the intellectual
property rights to their discoveries.7
These developments transformed life science-related departments at
major academic research institutions into profit centers that have come to
drive university initiatives and priorities. A significant shift in the focus
and size of federal funding for research further spurred this
transformation because massive amounts of money were poured into the
life sciences and basic research funding for NIH far exceeded that offered
to any other federal agency. These agencies not only conduct research in
their own right, but also are major sources of grants for academia. 72

Maryann Feldman, Alessandra Colaianni & Kang Liu, Commercializing Cohen-Boyer
1980-1997, DRUID Working Paper No. 05-21, 1 (2005), available at http://www.druid.dk/
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Combined with changes to intellectual property law such as the
Bayh-Dole Act, this massive infusion of funds into the life sciences has
led to a concomitant proliferation in biotechnology patents. The rise in
such patents maps rather closely to the rise in federal funding for the
NIH, which in turn is closely related to the massive federal investment in
the HGP beginning in the early 1990s.7 Federal policy, exemplified by
the HGP and combined with changes in intellectual property law, had a
profound effect upon the structure and conceptualization of academia,
transforming it into a major source of commercial activity. No longer
simply the sites of education and basic research, universities rapidly
became major engines of capital enterprise, product development, and
marketing.74
Major research universities now seem to be engaged in a never
ending hunt for the next biotechnological cash cow (or golden goose, for
those who prefer fowl).
The promises of biotechnology have
transformed universities into corporate partners, engaging in a myriad of
commercial ventures and plowing millions of dollars into research aimed
at providing return on investment, rather than the pursuit of core
academic missions of teaching and broadly furthering basic knowledge.
In 2007, the J. Craig Venter Institute together with the Center for
Strategic & International Studies ("CSIS"), and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology published a report titled, "Synthetic Genomics:
Options for Governance."75
An example of industry-academia
collaboration, the report referenced Asilomar in its introduction and
referenced it throughout the report. 76 The report focused on the
following areas:
* Enhancing biosecurity, either by preventing incidents of
bioterrorism or by helping law enforcement identify those
responsible if incidents should occur.
* Fostering laboratory safety, either by preventing accidents or by
helping to respond in the event an accident does occur.
* Protecting the environment, the people and natural ecosystems
outside the laboratory.7
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These are important areas to address and relatively typical of how
the risks of synthetic biology are frequently conceptualized. However,
they overlook such broad social and economic issues as the competition
for the allocation of scarce resources and the diversion of intellectual
capital from other avenues that seek to address the problems it aims to
solve.
In making its policy recommendations, the report purports a
measure of agnosticism with respect to regulation, stating, "[w]e made
no assumptions as to whether the options should be voluntary or legally
binding (regulatory) in nature and if so, who the regulators should be.
By the same token, we do not presuppose that the scientific community
will automatically address these issues on its own."78 While the report
does discuss the place of government regulation, it tends to confine such
oversight to the limited arena of licensing and record-keeping. The
report frequently consigns aspects of oversight to Institutional Biosafety
Committees ("IBCs"), which were established under the NIH Guidelines
for Recombinant DNA Research "to assess the biosafety and
environmental risks of proposed recombinant DNA experiments
conducted in academic and commercial settings, and to decide on the
appropriate level of biocontainment." 79 While established under federal
guidelines, such bodies are fundamentally private in nature and
ultimately a form of self-regulation by the institutions that maintain
them.
In 2010, when biotechnology is a major component of our economy
and professors in related fields are becoming millionaires and CEO's off
the fruits of their discoveries, the concept of self-regulation in
biotechnology must take on very different connotations than it had in
1975. When scientists asked for caution and self-restraint in 1975, they
were speaking largely to academic peers. Today the audience of
scientists being addressed are also entrepreneurs, many of whom are
directly enmeshed in complex economic enterprises or working for
academic institutions that have developed elaborate commercial
relationships with private industry. In this context, scientists cannot
simply choose to self-regulate according to their best individual scientific
judgment - they are also beholden to investors and corporate managers.
Commercial imperatives must necessarily intrude upon scientific
judgment in a manner inconceivable to the Asilomar scientists of 1975,
hence the need to pay closer attention to the calls for an approach more
fully informed by the precautionary principle.

78
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Proceed with new technologies, by all means. But proceed with
caution. The President's Commission suggested we approach synthetic
Perhaps, but I would suggest
biology with "prudent vigilance."
"skeptical vigilance" would be more in order.

